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I.  INTRODUCTION 
From toothpaste to toilet paper, chemicals play an integral role in 
producing essential everyday items.1  Though many chemicals are harmless 
and beneficial, poor management of hazardous chemicals can devastate the 
environment and jeopardize health.2  In 2006, the European Union (EU) 
passed sweeping chemical legislation to protect human health and the 
environment through the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and 
Restriction of Chemicals Regulation (REACH).3  However, the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) trade negotiations between the 
United States and EU could threaten REACH’s future effectiveness.4  TTIP 
is a proposed free trade agreement between the U.S. and the EU to further 
open the market between the world’s two largest economies.5  By further 
synchronizing and liberalizing the economic relationship between the EU 
and the U.S., trade representatives predict TTIP will increase wealth and 
create jobs.6  However, these economic pursuits could result in 
environmental degradation.7  Environmentalists fear that TTIP could 
undermine the EU’s stringent environmental laws—particularly the recently 
enacted REACH.8 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Julie Gerstein, The Truth About Natural Toothpaste, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING (Mar. 8, 
2010), http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/health/womens-health/natural-toothpaste-ingredien 
ts-0307; Jennifer Grayson, Eco Etiquette: Is My Toilet Paper Toxic?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 
12, 2011, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jennifer-grayson/eco-etiquette-is-my-toi 
le_b_1008317.html. 
 2 Chemicals in Our Waters Are Affecting Humans and Aquatic Life in Unanticipated Ways, 
SCI. DAILY (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02/080216095740. 
htm (discussing the contamination of waters and marine animals due to the release and 
accumulation of commercial chemicals).  
 3 Commission Regulation 1907/2006, Registration, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), 2006 O.J. (L 396) 6 [hereinafter REACH]. 
 4 See Brian Flood, U.S.–EU Trade Agreement Could Result in Dangerous Deregulation, 
NGOs Say, 36 INT’L ENV’T REP. 1003 (July 17, 2013).  
 5 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), ATLANTIC COUNCIL (June 21, 
2013), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/in-the-news/transatlantic-trade-and-investment-pa 
rtnership-ttip.  
 6 Fact Sheet: United States to Negotiate Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
with the European Union, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Feb. 13, 2013), https:// 
ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/february/US-EU-TTIP [hereinafter 
TTIP Fact Sheet]. 
 7 Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, “To Dream the Impossible Dream”: Globalization and 
Harmonization of Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 205, 210 (1995). 
 8 SIERRA CLUB, THE TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: WHAT’S AT STAKE FOR 
COMMUNITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13–14 (2013), available at http://action.sierraclub.org/ 
site/DocServer/TTIP_Report.pdf?docID=13541. 
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Ironically, some economists share the environmentalists’ uneasiness 
regarding TTIP’s effect on REACH because friction between national 
domestic regulations can compromise the success of a free trade agreement.9  
Though multiple U.S. and EU regulations conflict, this Note focuses on the 
conflict between the two chemical regulatory systems and urges that the two 
chemical regulatory systems should be harmonized.10  Harmonization is a 
process in which countries seek to unify conflicting laws to ease trade 
burdens.  This Note argues that the United States and European Union should 
harmonize “upward,” meaning that the United States should adopt chemical 
regulations matching the European Union’s REACH program.  Upward 
harmonization would accomplish TTIP’s economic goals by eliminating 
regulatory gaps that impede free trade.11  Upward harmonization would also 
strengthen the weak chemical regulatory system established by the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA) in the United States.12  
Part II will first examine the conflict between environmental law and 
international trade law.  Part III will discuss the negotiation that led up to the 
TIPP Agreement.  Part IV engages in a comparative analysis of REACH and 
TSCA.  Part V examines the legality of the REACH program through the 
lens of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the international organization 
governing trade relations between countries.  Finally, Part V explores various 
forms of regulatory harmonization and proposes full upward harmonization 
between REACH and TSCA.   
In sum, this Note takes the position that the United States should 
harmonize its chemical regulations upward by enacting new legislation to 
update the outdated TSCA.13  Upward harmonization can close the chemical 
regulatory gap between the U.S. and the EU and begin bridging the 
traditional gap between environmental law and international trade.14 
                                                                                                                   
 9 Bernabe-Riefkohl, supra note 7, at 212 (discussing the incompatibility between divergent 
national regulations and international economic development).  
 10 See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 6 (also proposing regulatory harmonization between 
divergent U.S. and EU regulatory systems to preserve and enhance environmental protection).  
 11 Alexander M. Donahue, Equivalence: Not Quite Close Enough for the International 
Harmonization of Environmental Standards, 30 ENVTL. L. 363, 365 (2000) (stating that 
“[s]tandards disparities obstruct imports and exports, create inefficiencies, and increase costs 
for international business, which in turn impedes international trade and slows the global train 
of prosperity”). 
 12 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (1976) [hereinafter TSCA]. 
 13 See James T. O’Reilly, Torture by TSCA: Retrospectives of a Failed Statute, 25 NAT. 
RES. & ENV’T 43, 43 (2010) (“TSCA has failed us and left us with a mere façade of effective 
environmental action.”). 
 14 Matthew Tuchband, Note, The Systemic Environmental Externalities of Free Trade: A 
Call for Wiser Trade Decisionmaking, 83 GEO. L.J. 2099, 2099 (1995) (suggesting that a gap 
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II.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FRICTION 
While the conflict between international trade and environmental law is 
not necessarily intuitive, it certainly exists.15  Environmentalists believe that 
because the free market fosters price competition, industry naturally flocks to 
areas where production is cheapest.16  Because environmental regulation is 
usually expensive, production tends to be cheapest in areas with fewer 
environmental regulations.17  Therefore, governments may lower 
environmental standards to attract industry.18   
Conversely, trade advocates argue that industry flocks to areas of 
advanced technology.19  Further, economic growth spurred by free trade 
gives industry more resources to develop better environmental controls and 
technology.20  Clearly, no simple way to reconcile the two positions exists.  
Nevertheless, closely examining the interaction between international trade 
and environment law better shapes the debate and can identify the core of the 
conflict. 
One solid starting point for examining the relationship between 
international trade and environmental law is through various provisions of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the multilateral 
agreement governing international trade in goods.21  For example, the GATT 
contains an anti-discrimination provision called “National Treatment” in 
Article II but carves out environmental exceptions to this rule in Article 
XX.22  The National Treatment principle states that WTO member countries 
cannot treat domestically produced goods more favorably than similar goods 
imported from foreign countries.23  GATT Article XX contains exceptions to 
the National Treatment provision for the preservation of human, animal, or 
                                                                                                                   
between environmental law and international trade exists because “[i]n much of the 
environmental community, trade is seen as antithetical to environmental protection”). 
 15 See Hajin Kim, Do Trade Liberalization and International Trade Law Constrain 
Domestic Environmental Regulation?, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10823, 10823−25 
(2013) (discussing the traditional arguments used by environmentalists and free trade 
enthusiasts that domestic environmental laws weaken international free trade and vice versa).  
 16 Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization: 
Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 271 
(1997). 
 17 See Kim, supra note 15, at 10823.  
 18 Id. at 10824. 
 19 Id. at 10823. 
 20 Id. at 10824.  
 21 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 22 Id. arts. III, XX. 
 23 Id. art. III(1)–(2). 
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plant life or health, and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, but 
only when these measures do not unnecessarily hinder trade.24  The 
interaction between these rules illustrates a presumption underlying the 
international trade system: countries will use various domestic policies—one 
of which is environmental regulation—to protect their domestic industries 
from foreign competition.25  Noting this seemingly hostile approach to 
environmental regulations, legal scholars have long lamented that 
environmental protection was being sacrificed for economic interests at an 
alarming rate.26  
As mentioned above, the emphasis of price competition in capitalist 
societies contributes to the conflict between environmental regulations and 
economic policies.27  Companies operating in areas with weak environmental 
rules can generally sell goods at lower prices than companies operating in 
areas with strong environmental laws.28  As a result, companies have an 
incentive to operate in areas with less stringent environmental regulations to 
create a higher profit margin.29  Exacerbating the problem, the high cost of 
controlling environmental harms conflicts with the goals of cutting costs and 
producing competitively priced goods.30 
Furthermore, dispute resolution systems at the WTO and within regional 
trade agreements can impose large penalties for restricting imports to comply 
with environmental laws.31  These mechanisms may incentivize countries to 
under-enforce domestic environmental laws or never enact them at all if 
those laws restrict importation.32 
                                                                                                                   
 24 Id. art. XX(b), (g).   
 25 Ari Afilalo & Sheila Foster, The World Trade Organization’s Anti-Discrimination 
Jurisprudence: Free Trade, National Sovereignty, and Environmental Health in the Balance, 
15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 633, 652 (2003) (noting that the broad goals of the GATT and 
disputes involving National Treatment claims are associated with “rooting out 
protectionism”).  
 26 Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, Making Trade and Environmental Policies 
Mutually Reinforcing: Forging Competitive Sustainability, 23 ENVTL. L. 545, 547 (1993).  
 27 See Esty & Geradin, supra note 16, at 271 (discussing the proposition that countries 
compete with one another to produce cheaper goods and that stringent environmental 
regulations raise the price of production).  
 28 Id.  
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See J. Carol Williams, The Next Frontier: Environmental Law in a Trade-Dominated 
World, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 232 (2001). 
 32 Id. at 222–25, 227 (discussing the dispute resolution mechanism in the NAFTA 
Investment Chapter that allows private corporations to sue governments if they believe a 
country’s environmental laws or regulations violate its rights under the free trade agreement, 
732 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 43:727 
 
Similarly, broad societal values can push environmental and economic 
goals in opposite directions and create disputes.33  For example, in an effort 
to protect wildlife, the U.S. restricted imports of tuna caught by purse seine 
fishing, a fishing method that can kill dolphins.34  Ultimately, one reason the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled against the U.S. measure was because 
it undermined economic goals.35  This decision left the U.S. to decide 
whether to pay penalties for restricting trade and continue to protect animals, 
or forego its environmental goals to promote trade in compliance with WTO 
standards.  While both free trade and environmental protection enhance 
social well-being,36 they inevitably conflict because societies, like 
individuals, have conflicting desires.37  Therefore, conflict between 
environmental protection and free trade is common and often inevitable.38  
III.  THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 
President Obama announced in February 2013 that the U.S. would launch 
negotiations with the EU on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).39  The overarching goal of TTIP is to enhance economic 
growth and create jobs by further expanding the economic relationship 
between the U.S. and EU, which is already the largest in the world.40  The 
United States Trade Representative Office’s (USTR) press release first 
stressed the importance of the economic relationship between the U.S. and 
the EU41 and then stressed the need to eliminate regulatory differences to cut 
costs and promote trade.42  Thus, the U.S. appears to be following the 
traditional model of the trade/environment debate by framing regulatory 
                                                                                                                   
as and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’s ability to quickly adopt binding reports that can 
result in financial retaliation against a country with trade-restrictive environmental policies). 
 33 See generally Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 658, 674–76 
(1996) (discussing the idea that free trade principles tend to overlook other important 
noneconomic societal goals). 
 34 Afilalo & Foster, supra note 25, at 656. 
 35 Id. at 665. 
 36 Nita Ghei, Evaluating the WTO’s Two Step Test for Environmental Measures Under 
Article XX, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 117, 119 (2007).  
 37 See Nichols, supra note 33, at 674. 
 38 Id. 
 39 TTIP Fact Sheet, supra note 6. 
 40 Id. (“The President’s decision recognizes that the U.S.-EU economic relationship is 
already the world’s largest, accounting for one third of total goods and services trade and 
nearly half of global economic output.”). 
 41 Id. (noting that the EU is the largest importer of U.S. goods at $465 billion and the U.S.-
EU investment relationship totals $4 trillion and contributes to over 9 million U.S. jobs). 
 42 Id. 
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differences in terms of the economic bottom line.  However, this Note posits 
that the U.S. has an unprecedented opportunity to turn the trade/environment 
conflict on its head.  The U.S.’s goal of eliminating regulatory differences43 
could also be accomplished through upward harmonization of environmental 
regulatory standards to those of the EU level.  Considering the Obama 
Administration’s support for TSCA reform,44 TTIP could be the missing link 
to remedying the shortcomings of TSCA while opening the market for 
chemical trade with the EU in an environmentally responsible way.  The 
U.S.’s and EU’s opportunity to use economic goals to reinforce 
environmental goals and vice versa is particularly unique in the context of 
TTIP because bilateral trade agreements allow nations to set new standards 
for unique areas such as the environment.45   
A.  State of Negotiations 
So far, the USTR has outlined two major issues regarding upcoming TTIP 
negotiations: eliminating nontariff barriers and reconciling regulatory 
differences.46  First, leaders of the U.S. and the EU want to address trade 
flow problems by reducing nontariff barriers.47  Whereas tariffs limit imports 
by directly placing charges on the goods at customs, nontariff barriers 
include nonmonetary measures that block trade, such as import quotas or 
strict health standards.48  Consequently, domestic environmental laws can 
also operate as nontariff barriers,49 making REACH susceptible to 
                                                                                                                   
 43 Id. 
 44 Frances Beinecke, Great Opportunity to Protect American Families from Toxic 
Chemicals, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2010, 5:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fran 
ces-beinecke/great-opportunity-to-prot_b_546333.html.  
 45 Pascal Lamy, Director-General, World Trade Organization, Speech at the Confederation of 
Indian Industries Partnership Summit 2007: Emergent India: New Roles and Responsibilities 
(Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e//sppl53_e.htm.  
 46 Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Transcript: Briefing by 
USTR Ambassador Ron Kirk and Deputy National Security Advisor Michael Froman on US-
EU Trade Negotiations (Feb. 13, 2013, 9:45 AM), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pre 
ss-office/press-releases/2013/february/transcript-briefing-us-eu [hereinafter Briefing on U.S.–
EU Trade Negotiations].  
 47 Id. (stating that “[t]he high-level working group recommended that the EU and the 
United States . . . mak[e] substantial progress on tackling and reducing non-tariff areas and 
addressing liberalization in areas of service investment, labor and the environment, among 
other issues”). 
 48 Donahue, supra note 11, at 365.  
 49 JENNIFER L. MACHLIN & TOMME R. YOUNG, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK: REAL 
ESTATE AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, § 12:16 (2012).  
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elimination during negotiations if the U.S. considers REACH a nontariff 
barrier.50  
Early statements describing negotiations suggest that the U.S. and the EU 
are approaching the issue from different angles.  U.S. Trade Representative 
Michael Froman stated that “our intent is to negotiate a comprehensive 
agreement . . . [by] looking at the regulatory barriers and the barriers that our 
different standards pose to further integration of our economy.”51  The 
European Commission, on the other hand, stated that the EU will: 
[N]ot negotiate existing levels of protection for the sake of an 
agreement. [The EU’s] high level of protection . . . is non-
negotiable. . .  The negotiations will not be about lowering 
standards: they are about getting rid of tariffs and useless red-
tape while keeping high standards in place.  There will be no 
compromise whatsoever on safety, consumer protection or the 
environment.52   
Thus, while both governments are eager to expand and strengthen their 
economies, environmental tensions are apparent from the outset. 
B.  Fundamental Differences Between U.S. and EU Environmental Law and 
the Effect on TTIP Negotiations 
The official statements produced above only scratch the surface of 
environmental law and international trade tensions affecting TTIP 
negotiations.  First, the U.S. and the EU disagree on the appropriate theory 
for approaching environmental regulation: the EU employs elements of the 
Precautionary Principle into environmental regulations, while the U.S. 
adheres more closely to a risk assessment approach.53  The Precautionary 
                                                                                                                   
 50 SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 13–14 (“The USTR has expressed a number of concerns 
over the EU’s REACH program, signaling that chemical regulatory differences will be on the 
TTIP negotiating table.”).  
 51 Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 46.  
 52 Press Release, European Commission, FAQ on the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (‘TTIP’) (June 17, 2013), available at http://trade.ed.europa.eu/docli 
b/docs/2013/may/tradoc_151351.pdf.  
 53 Lawrence A. Kogan, What Goes Around Comes Around: How UNCLOS Ratification Will 
Herald Europe’s Precautionary Principle as U.S. Law, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 23, 37 
(2009) (“U.S. law has . . . employed mostly risk-based precaution, which more or less 
balances environmental protection against other considerations, namely empirical risk 
assessment and economic costs, while EU law, which employs hazard-based precaution, does 
not.”); see generally Anne C. Dowling, Note, “Un-Locke-ing” a “Just Right” Environmental 
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Principle adopts the position that a lack of solid scientific evidence about a 
potential risk should not discourage preventative regulation.54  The U.S.’s 
risk assessment approach relies more heavily upon clear scientific proof of 
environmental dangers and economic cost-balancing before encouraging 
regulation.55  Notably, the EU’s Precautionary Principle approach, expressed 
in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, takes 
a more balanced approach by mixing elements of risk assessment into its 
approach to the Precautionary Principle.56  Still, the EU approach is more 
environmentally conscious than the U.S.’s risk assessment approach in 
comparison.  
The EU’s transparent incorporation of the principle of sustainability into 
domestic EU law further illustrates differences between the U.S. and EU 
environmental protection values.  Article 2 of the European Community 
Treaty includes environmental protection as a general objective and adopts 
the principle of sustainable development in Article 6.57  While the U.S. 
certainly enacts and enforces a wealth of extensive and comprehensive 
environmental laws, it does not have comparable constitutional provisions or 
federal laws with such general breadth. 
                                                                                                                   
Regime: Overcoming the Three Bears of International Environmentalism—Sovereignty, 
Locke, and Compensation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 891 (2002) (describing 
the history and development of U.S. environmental law). 
 54 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., 
June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) (declaring in Principle 15 that in the 
event of “threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation”).  
 55 Kogan, supra note 53, at 37.  
 56 Summaries of EU Legislation: The Precautionary Principle, EUROPA, http://eur-lex.eur 
opa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al32042 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (“The 
precautionary principle shall be informed by three specific principles: [1] the fullest possible 
scientific evaluation, the determination, as far as possible, of the degree of scientific 
uncertainty; [2] a risk evaluation and an evaluation of the potential consequences of inaction; 
[and] [3] the participation of all interested parties in the study of precautionary measures, once 
the results of the scientific evaluation and/or the risk evaluation are available.  In addition, the 
general principles of risk management remain applicable when the precautionary principle is 
invoked.  These are the following five principles: [1] proportionality between the measures 
taken and the chosen level of protection; [2] non-discrimination in application of the 
measures; [3] consistency of the measures with similar measures already taken in similar 
situations or using similar approaches; [4] examination of the benefits and costs of action or 
lack of action; [and] [5] review of the measures in the light of scientific developments.”).  
 57 Beate Sjafjell, Internalizing Externalities in EU Law: Why Neither Corporate 
Governance Nor Corporate Social Responsibility Provides the Answers, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 977, 978 (2009). 
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Another distinction between U.S. and EU environmental law is a 
temporal distinction.  A large proportion of U.S. environmental law passed in 
the 1970s as citizens became more aware of mounting environmental 
degradation.58  Because Congress tends to move slowly when amending 
existing legislation, alleged deficiencies have not been remedied efficiently 
or quickly.59  On the other hand, EU environmental legislation such as 
REACH is more recent and engineered to better tackle present-day 
problems.60  A comparative analysis of TSCA and REACH more aptly 
illustrates the general differences between the U.S.’s and EU’s 
environmental law approaches and the more specific chemical regulatory 
differences.  
IV.  REACH & TSCA: A COMPARISON 
The framework of REACH highlights the shortcomings of the U.S. 
chemical regulatory system, TSCA.  This section will examine the 
substantive and procedural provisions of REACH before examining TSCA to 
illuminate those differences.  Ultimately, knowing these regulatory 
differences can also inform and shape the harmonization discussion. 
A.  REACH 
The basic structure of the regulation comes from REACH’s title: 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction.61  Registration, the 
first phase of REACH, demonstrates the unprecedented breadth of the 
regulation because it applies to most existing and new chemicals produced or 
imported in excess of one ton.62  Companies producing chemicals, using 
chemicals in the production of other items, and companies importing or 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Dowling, supra note 53, at 921–22. 
 59 See generally Michael G. Faure & Jason Scott Johnston, The Law and Economics of 
Environmental Federalism: Europe and the United States Compared, 27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 205, 
212–14 (2009) (describing the onslaught of U.S. federal environmental law in the 1970s in 
comparison with the EU’s difficulties enacting all-encompassing environmental law until after 
1987 when “the EEC Treaty was revised to include provisions that specifically authorized the 
EC to promulgate environmental directives”).  
 60 See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 46 (suggesting that TSCA is inadequate because chemical 
production and chemical exposure has changed since TSCA’s enactment).  
 61 John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical 
Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 742 (2008). 
 62 Id. 
2015] REACHING FOR HARMONY  737 
 
exporting chemicals (or “articles”63 containing chemicals) in the requisite 
amounts must register the chemicals with the European Chemicals Agency 
(ECHA).64  The ECHA is a central, independent entity managing the 
administration of REACH.65  During the Registration phase, chemical 
manufacturers conduct tests and submit data to the ECHA regarding the 
physical properties and inherent risks of the chemicals they manufacture or 
import.66  This data “require[s] the production of basic toxicological data, 
including studies of environmental toxicity . . . [and] chemical safety reports 
that describe exposures and measures to reduce risks.”67  Further, REACH’s 
testing requirements are the most stringent in the world, emphasizing the 
potentially huge impact REACH could have on the global chemical 
industry.68 
During the “Evaluation” stage, the ECHA evaluates the information 
gathered by industry to determine whether the chemical or the article 
containing the chemical poses a threat to the environment.69  The criteria 
used to make this determination include information regarding the hazardous 
properties of the chemical, the chemical’s structural similarity to other 
dangerous chemicals, how much of the chemical is produced, and the effects 
of exposure to the chemical.70  If it determines that the chemical presents a 
risk to the environment based on these criteria, the ECA categorizes the 
chemical as a “substance of very high concern” (VHC).71  These VHC 
substances then proceed to the Authorization stage.72 
Passing the Authorization stage requires substitution of the VHC 
substance with a safer alternative, proof that risks associated with the 
                                                                                                                   
 63 REACH, supra note 3, art. 3(3) (defining “article” as “an object which during production 
is given a special shape, surface or design which determines its function to a greater degree 
than does its chemical composition”).  
 64 Id. intro. (15). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Lawrence A. Kogan, REACH Revisited: A Framework for Evaluating Whether a Non-
Tariff Measure Has Matured Into an Actionable Non-Tariff Barrier to Trade, 28 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 489, 612–13 (2013).  
 67 David A. Wirth, The EU’s New Impact on U.S. Environmental Regulation, 31 FLETCHER 
F. WORLD AFF. 91, 100 (2007). 
 68 Id. at 91, 100, 102–03 (explaining that REACH has already begun to infiltrate the U.S. 
economy by influencing the actions of chemical manufacturers, and that harmonizing 
regulatory systems can prevent a competition distortion in the marketplace).  
 69 REACH, supra note 3, at tit. VI, ch. 2, art. 44(2). 
 70 Id. tit. VI, ch. 2, art. 44, (1)(a)–(c). 
 71 See Conrad Benedetto, Is the European Laboratory Over-REACH-ing?  The 
Experimentation, Reaction and Product Yielded by the European Union’s Registration, 
Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 83 (2010). 
 72 Applegate, supra note 61, at 742. 
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chemical are “adequately controlled,” or proof that the benefits of the VHC 
substance outweigh its risks.73  The European Commission, the executive 
arm of the EU, exerts jurisdiction over the Authorization stage.74  The 
chemical may only enter the stream of commerce if the European 
Commission finds justification for its sale notwithstanding its dangerous 
properties.75  Accordingly, if the applicant cannot substitute the VHC 
substance with an alternative substance or show that the chemical’s benefits 
outweigh its risks, then the chemical is subject to restriction.76  The European 
Commission and member states centrally implement restrictions, subjecting 
the chemicals to a partial or total ban from the market.77  
These provisions establish a comprehensive, stringent regulatory system 
unlike any other in the world, which could fundamentally change global 
chemical trade.78  REACH’s mandates are particularly relevant to the U.S. 
for several interrelated reasons.  First, the U.S. is the world’s top chemical 
producer and exports substantial amounts of chemicals to the EU79  Second, 
chemical trade primarily occurs through multinational corporations, making 
the chemical industry a global industry.80  Further, because the regulatory 
controls outlined in REACH do not match the regulatory controls of TSCA, 
U.S. chemicals are not subjected to the same level of scrutiny as REACH-
registered EU chemicals.81  In fact, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has evaluated only 2% of the sixty thousand pre-existing 
chemicals since 1976.82  An additional twenty-two thousand new chemicals 
have escaped testing for public or environmental safety under TSCA.83  
                                                                                                                   
 73 REACH, supra note 3, at intro. (22); Applegate, supra note 61, at 742–43; Benedetto, 
supra note 71, at 83.  
 74 Wirth, supra note 67, at 101.  
 75 REACH, supra note 3, at intro. (22).  
 76 Applegate, supra note 61, at 743. 
 77 REACH, supra note 3, at intro. (23); Applegate, supra note 61, at 742–43. 
 78 Paul E. Hagen, Product-Based Environmental Regulations: Europe Sets the Pace, 6 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y (2006) (“[I]n conditioning market access to adherence with 
new product standards, the EU is . . . establishing global product standards, as few U.S. 
companies can afford to ignore a potential consumer market that is now much larger than the 
United States or even all of North America.”). 
 79 Benedetto, supra note 71, at 83; Applegate, supra note 54, at 767. 
 80 Applegate, supra note 54, at 767; Wirth, supra note 67, at 103. 
 81 Applegate, supra note 61, at 741 (stating that “it is hard to read [REACH’s legislative 
history as] anything other than an effort to make REACH everything that TSCA was not”). 
 82 SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 13. 
 83 Molly Rauch, 5 Ways the Outdated Toxic Chemicals Law Makes Us Sick, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Oct. 11, 2013, 6:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/molly-rauch/toxic-substances-
control-act_b_4084879.html. 
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Overall, 95% of chemicals have undergone little to no testing.”84  Therefore, 
the EU can presumably ban importation of U.S. chemicals which have not 
complied with the required Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization 
phases of REACH, or that have already been restricted from the European 
market.85  Therefore, trade tensions have surfaced because U.S. chemical 
regulations do not meet EU standards.86  To better understand these 
regulatory differences and their effect on the trade relationship between the 
U.S. and EU, examining the general framework of TSCA in comparison to 
REACH is also helpful.  
B.  TSCA  
Mirroring its present-day instability, TSCA had a rocky start.87  In 1971, 
as federal environmental legislation swept the nation, the Council on 
Environmental Quality proposed toxic substances legislation aimed at 
regulating chemicals from the cradle to the grave.88  After a five year delay, 
environmental catastrophes, such as the contamination of the Hudson River, 
finally prompted Congress to pass TSCA.89  Unfortunately, TSCA did not 
live up to its creators’ expectations.90  Over the years, each branch of the 
U.S. government has interfered with TSCA’s goal of widespread chemical 
regulation.91 While TSCA had the potential to comprehensively regulate 
chemicals and chemical manufacturing if strictly construed, it is now 
                                                                                                                   
 84 Wirth, supra note 67, at 102. 
 85 See generally Kogan, supra note 66, at 586–87 (noting complaints by Japan and the U.S. 
that REACH Title VIII could result in import restrictions). 
 86 See id. at 514 (stating that “at least thirty-four non-EU WTO Members have expressed 
specific trade concerns about the EU REACH regulation” signifying widespread concern 
throughout the international community).  
 87 See generally O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (explaining that many of TSCA’s 
shortcomings stemmed from successful lobbying efforts from the chemical industry).  
 88 LINDA-JO SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31905, THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
CONTROL ACT (TSCA): A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 2 (Feb. 2, 
2010), available at http://www.gmaonline.org/file-manager/Chemicals/TSCA.CRS_REPORT. 
pdf (explaining that the purpose of TSCA was to “identify and control chemicals whose 
manufacture, processing, distribution, use, and/or disposal was potentially dangerous and not 
adequately regulated under other environmental statutes”).  
 89 Id. (attributing the legislative delay to “controversies over the scope of chemical 
screening . . . costs, and [TSCA’s] relationship to other regulatory laws. . . .”).  
 90 See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 47 (concluding that TSCA never accomplished its 
supporters’ goals).  
 91 See Applegate, supra note 61, at 723 (stating that TSCA’s “highly compromised final 
statutory text, hostile judicial interpretation, and often timid implementation” have led to the 
EPA primarily relying on the chemical industry to regulate itself).  
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toothless in comparison to REACH.92  According to James T. O’Reilly, one 
of TSCA’s original negotiators, “TSCA has failed and left us with a mere 
façade of effective environmental action.”93  
1.  TSCA’s Structure  
TSCA consists of six Titles.94  Title I sets out the general procedural and 
substantive requirements of the Act, while Titles II–VI cover asbestos, radon, 
lead, formaldehyde, and environmental topics concerning schools.95  Titles 
II–VI are limited in scope, allowing the EPA to only set standards to govern 
usages of these chemicals in special circumstances.96  Thus, at the outset, 
TSCA’s conservative structure and limiting language constrain the breadth of 
chemical regulation in the U.S., especially in comparison to the broad scope 
of REACH.97  Notwithstanding the limited application of Titles II–VI, Title I 
contains more broadly applicable rules and standards for chemical 
regulation.98 
The general structure of Title I resembles REACH’s structure.99  
Chemical producers must conduct tests on potentially dangerous 
chemicals.100  After producers submit this information to the EPA, the 
agency then funnels the information into a database called the “inventory” of 
chemicals.101  After the testing and information-gathering period, the EPA 
must regulate chemicals that it determines pose a risk to the environment.102 
                                                                                                                   
 92 O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (observing that despite its potential, TSCA is much weaker 
than REACH). 
 93 Id.  
 94 See generally TSCA, supra note 12, §§ 2601–2692. 
 95 Id.; SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at 3 (outlining Titles II–VI). 
 96 See, e.g., SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at 3 (noting that Title II focuses on asbestos usage in 
schools and sets requirements for asbestos contractors; Title III only guides the EPA to assist 
states that choose to monitor and control radon; and Title IV’s scope is limited to lead-based 
paint). 
 97 See generally O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (suggesting that TSCA’s weak language 
defeated its ambitious goals). 
 98 TSCA, supra note 12; see Applegate, supra note 61, at 725 (noting that TSCA was 
structured to comprehensively regulate chemicals).  
 99 See Applegate, supra note 61, at 753 (“[T]he basic structure of TSCA represents an 
integrated, comprehensive approach.  The European Union seeks to accomplish essentially the 
same goals with REACH.”). 
 100 See SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at 3 (explaining that if insufficient data exists to evaluate a 
chemical’s safety, testing is required when the chemical’s production creates unreasonable 
risks or could potentially be released into the environment in large quantities). 
 101 E.g., id. at 3, 5. 
 102 Id. at 5. 
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2.  TSCA in Action 
Though the structure of Title I appears facially comprehensive and 
stringent—setting forth a scheme of testing, information gathering, and 
regulation of both old and new chemicals—TSCA has not significantly 
curtailed dangerous chemical production and distribution.103  A number of 
factors explain this failure.  First, the testing requirements set out in TSCA 
Section IV are conditional: manufacturers or producers must only test 
existing chemicals if the chemicals pose an “unreasonable risk of injury to 
health or the environment,” or if the chemicals are “produced in substantial 
quantities” and the chemical “enters or may reasonably be anticipated to 
enter the environment in substantial quantities,” or insufficient data prevents 
the EPA from safely predicting its harmful effects.104  The problem is that 
words like “substantial,” “significant,” and “unreasonable” are inherently 
subjective, giving wide latitude to the interpreter.105  Amplifying the 
problem, essentially all of TSCA’s substantive provisions are couched in the 
undefined term “unreasonable.”106  Therefore, because most regulatory 
provisions are not automatically compulsory and are partly dependent upon 
the judgment of one individual (the EPA Administrator), some chemicals 
may never even enter the first stage of regulation under TSCA.107 
Notwithstanding these discrepancies, TSCA gives the EPA authority to 
identify dangerous chemicals and gather information about their potential 
environmental effects.108  TSCA Section IV(a)’s broad language grants the 
EPA this authority in a wide range of circumstances.109  For example, if the 
EPA Administrator finds that the manufacture, sale, or disposal of a chemical 
presents an unreasonable risk, and the effects of the chemical are unknown or 
uncertain, the EPA can regulate.110  Section IV also broadly sweeps 
                                                                                                                   
 103 See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (“TSCA was floated with great ambitions, but it has 
bombed with tepid results due to its flawed wording.”).  
 104 TSCA, supra note 12, § 2603(a).  
 105 See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (referencing the “obscure and inconsistent phrases” 
that have contributed to TSCA’s ineffectiveness).  But see Applegate, supra note 61, at 729 
(suggesting that while the term “unreasonable risk” is undefined in TSCA, legislative history 
and subsequent jurisprudence may guide interpretation of the term).   
 106 Applegate, supra note 61, at 728, 731 (postulating that Congress’s use of the term 
“unreasonable” with no statutory definition was also meant to protect the chemical industry). 
 107 See generally TSCA, supra note 12, § 2603 (giving the EPA authority to promulgate 
regulatory rules if the Administrator finds reason to do so).  
 108 SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at Summary.  
 109 TSCA, supra note 12, § 2603(a). 
 110 Id. 
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chemicals into the regulation based upon both quality and quantity.111  
Accordingly, the EPA may regulate chemicals that pose unreasonable risks 
to the environment based on the chemical’s individual characteristics, as well 
as chemicals produced in large quantities if their release into the environment 
is likely.112 
However, to determine whether regulation is necessary, the EPA must 
acquire relevant information about the chemical’s qualities or the quantity of 
chemicals produced.113  The EPA can require that manufacturers conduct 
scientific tests to provide this information.114  TSCA section 4(b) provides 
that companies that manufacture or possess potentially harmful chemicals 
“shall be required to conduct tests and submit data.”115  If the EPA finds that 
the chemical poses an unreasonable risk based on this data, the agency can 
impose a broad range of regulations to minimize the chemical’s 
environmental impact.116  However, the EPA must choose the least 
burdensome regulatory option by balancing the benefits of the chemical, 
including the economic benefits, with its potential harm.117  The inclusion of 
language like “unreasonable risk” and “least burdensome alternatives” 
indicates congressional acquiescence to the preferences of industry instead of 
TSCA’s environmental objectives.118 
Other TSCA provisions also seem deceptively comprehensive and 
stringent; however, in their application, these provisions dwindle in 
effectiveness.119  For example, Section 8 requires that producers report all 
potentially dangerous chemicals to the EPA.120  Section 5 requires that 
producers notify the EPA when producing any new chemicals or using 
                                                                                                                   
 111 Id. § 2603(a)(1)(B)(i).  
 112 SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at 2. 
 113 See id. at 5 (describing TSCA Section 8 provisions requiring the EPA to gather 
information and granting EPA authority to collect information from industry). 
 114 Id. at Summary. 
 115 TSCA, supra note 12, § 2603(b)(3)(B). 
 116 SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at Summary. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43 (arguing that TSCA never reached its environmental 
goals due to industry lobbying, which allowed industry to “dodge the bullet”); see also 
Applegate, supra note 61, at 730–31 (suggesting that the “unreasonable risk” standard 
represents Congress’s desire to protect the chemical industry).  
 119 Applegate, supra note 61, at 732–33 (describing the shortcomings of §§ 4 and 8 and the 
regulatory inadequacies created by the distinction between existing and new chemicals); see 
O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 43–44 (describing “three failures” of TSCA, which include the 
“weak and conditional” §§ 6 and 8 provisions on regulation and reporting, and the § 14 data 
disclosure provision which effectively prevents EPA from releasing pertinent information 
submitted by industry).  
 120 TSCA, supra note 12, § 2607(e). 
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existing chemicals in new ways.121  However, the regulatory actions the EPA 
can take after receiving this information are limited.122  Though Section 6 
gives the EPA authority to limit or ban the production of dangerous 
chemicals, the provision only authorizes the EPA to invoke “the least 
burdensome regulatory approach, even in controlling unreasonable risks.”123  
Just as Section 4’s subjective language creates uncertainty and can limit the 
EPA’s regulatory authority, the “least burdensome” language of Section 6 
takes even more enforcement power from the EPA’s ability to effectively 
regulate chemicals.124 
C.  REACH/TSCA Similarities and Differences 
Understanding the similarities and differences between TSCA and 
REACH is critical for predicting the tenor of TTIP negotiations and the 
possibility and difficulties of harmonization.  Trade negotiators are well 
aware of the incompatibility between U.S. and EU chemical regulations, so 
an agreement to harmonize one or both of the systems to simplify trade is 
conceivable.125 
Because the imbalance between the U.S. and EU chemical regulatory 
systems cuts against TTIP’s free trade goals, differences between TSCA and 
REACH are most germane to the purposes of this Note.  In fact, the 
Europeans based many of REACH’s provisions on the observation of 
TSCA’s failures.126  However, REACH still resembles TSCA in many basic, 
structural ways.127  
                                                                                                                   
 121 Id. § 2604(a).  
 122 See generally O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 44 (explaining that “[c]onstraints on the 
operation of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act were heavily influenced by industry” and that the 
1991 court ruling in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991), 
“undercut the potency of TSCA” by requiring the EPA to defer chemical control to another 
federal agency). 
 123 SCHIEROW, supra note 88, at 5. 
 124 See O’Reilly, supra note 13, at 44 (“Sections 6 and 8 of TSCA are weak and very 
conditional.”). 
 125 See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 13–14 (“The USTR has expressed a number of 
concerns over the EU’s REACH program, signaling that chemical regulatory differences will 
be on the TTIP negotiating table.”); see also Bernabe-Riefkohl, supra note 7, at 212 
(explaining that “countries have to ‘harmonize’ their laws to avoid obstructing free trade and 
economic development, especially as they organize into economic alliances or transnational 
trading blocs”).  
 126 Applegate, supra note 61, at 741.    
 127 See id. at 721 (explaining that REACH provisions mirror many of TSCA’s basic 
regulatory approaches). 
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1.  Similarities 
REACH and TSCA have several political, structural, and procedural 
similarities.128  Both REACH and TSCA were enacted after government 
acknowledgment that the environment was at risk due to insufficient data 
about chemicals.129  REACH and TSCA share broad goals of comprehensive 
chemical regulation.130  Additionally, both regulations arguably take a 
moderate approach to chemical regulation by balancing the primary goals of 
environmental protection and human safety with countervailing economic 
interests.131  Further, TSCA and REACH each regulate chemicals directly at 
the source, make initial chemical testing conditional, and make governmental 
restrictions procedurally complex, often to benefit the chemical industry.132  
2.  Differences 
The structural similarities and parallel goals of REACH and TSCA could 
simplify the harmonization process, but crucial differences in the regulations 
also create significant hurdles.133  First, as discussed above, REACH and 
TSCA rest on different theoretical environmental principles.134  The U.S. 
embraces a science-based “risk assessment” approach, whereas the EU relies 
more upon the Precautionary Principle.135 
Second, TSCA and REACH approach burden of proof issues 
differently.136  In TSCA, this difference results in looser regulation and less 
power for the EPA.137  While the burden to produce information showing a 
new chemical’s safety initially falls on U.S. chemical manufacturers, the 
                                                                                                                   
 128 See generally id. at 753–62 (describing various similarities between REACH and TSCA, 
including the balancing of environmental and economic protection and the creation of more 
data about chemicals).   
 129 Id. at 723. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 753–54. 
 132 See id. at 730–32, 746–47 (explaining the similarities between REACH and TSCA).  
 133 See generally Wirth, supra note 67, at 102–03 (discussing U.S. efforts to block REACH, 
which could suggest U.S. reluctance to change TSCA provisions that are contrary to 
REACH). 
 134 See Applegate, supra note 61, at 765 (proposing that TSCA reform will require the U.S. 
to embrace of the Precautionary Principle). 
 135 See Benedetto, supra note 71, at 79 (highlighting the difference between U.S. and EU 
chemical regulatory approaches by explaining that “[t]he European Parliament specifically 
rejected the United States’ model of chemical regulation by adopting the precautionary 
principle . . . preempt[ing] complete scientific proof of the harm of a chemical”).  
 136 Applegate, supra note 61, at 736–37. 
 137 Id.  
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burden shifts to the EPA to prove, by a substantial evidence standard, that the 
chemicals present an unreasonable risk to the environment or human 
health.138  Because the EPA cannot compel manufacturers to provide extra 
information or conduct additional research on the chemical, proving 
unreasonable risk requires a wealth of information the EPA does not readily 
possess.139  REACH, on the other hand, ultimately places the burden on the 
chemical industry.140  Therefore, the ECHA can prove a chemical is too 
dangerous for manufacture, sale, or distribution under a less stringent 
standard.141  As a result, the EPA has less power to curb dangerous chemical 
production in comparison to the ECHA.142 
Another important difference is the regulations’ treatment of new and 
existing chemicals.  TSCA gives the EPA little power over chemicals that 
existed before TSCA’s enactment, limiting EPA oversight on 99% of the 
chemicals in commerce.143  However, new chemicals must undergo pre-
manufacture notice, which requires manufacturers to present data regarding 
new chemicals and new uses of existing chemicals.144  Conversely, 
REACH’s provisions apply equally to new and existing chemicals, sweeping 
all chemicals into the regulation.145  Only chemicals produced in quantities of 
less than one ton per year escape regulation under REACH.146  While 
REACH and TSCA exhibit some similarities, these differences suggest a 
need for harmonization147 because having one uniform standard would make 
chemical production more efficient.148 
                                                                                                                   
 138 Id.  
 139 See id. at 735–36 (stating that “EPA must take what [information] it is given” because 
TSCA’s pre-manufacture notice provision “does not require the creation of any new safety 
data”).  
 140 See id. at 745–46.  
 141 See generally id. (explaining that under REACH, manufacturers bear a heavier burden 
than the ECHA because “the party with the burden must move the status quo”).  
 142 See id. (comparing the EPA’s burden of proof which “clearly contributes to TSCA’s 
ineffectiveness,” to REACH’s burden of proof).  
 143 Id. at 731–32.  
 144 Id. at 727.  
 145 Id. at 743–44. 
 146 Id.  
 147 Id. at 752–53 (noting that “TSCA is clearly overdue for reform” and that U.S. businesses 
will have to comply with REACH to maintain access to the European market).  
 148 See Donahue, supra note 11, at 365 (explaining that differences in domestic 
environmental standards can restrict international trade by raising the costs of international 
business).  
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V.  REACH’S CONSISTENCY WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
The previous sections argue that REACH is the superior environmental 
response to chemical regulation.  However, a holistic analysis of the REACH 
program in the context of TTIP negotiations must also consider the 
international economic impact of REACH. 
Even under the normative assumption that REACH is a superior regime, 
the United States currently does not have a direct incentive to change its 
chemical regulatory system.  Just because the Europeans choose a certain 
level of human health and environmental protection does not automatically 
suggest that other sovereign nations could or should enact similar policies.149  
Nevertheless, both direct and indirect forces may bring sovereign nations’ 
laws closer together.150  
A phenomenon referred to as “The California Effect” could indirectly 
encourage and foster regulatory harmonization.151  The “California Effect” 
occurs when one large market participant demands that certain standards be 
met, and other markets acquiesce to those demands to obtain access to the 
large market.152  For example, California, as the most populous state, is a 
huge contributor to the U.S. economy with high environmental standards.153  
Companies not based in California often alter their manufacturing methods 
to meet California’s environmental standards and gain access to the huge 
California market.154  As a matter of efficiency, these non-California 
companies often apply the changes across the board because applying one 
standard becomes cheaper than having multiple standards.155  Therefore, 
                                                                                                                   
 149 But see Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The 
Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 401, 407 (1995) (suggesting that 
harmonization in the context of trade agreements and international economic integration is 
crucial because “the establishment of a successful economic community . . . require[s] 
harmonization of national laws”). 
 150 See id. at 402 (providing, through the example of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), that interaction between countries through free trade agreements can 
foster harmonization of domestic laws).   
 151 Wirth, supra note 67, at 96–97 (describing the “California Effect”). 
 152 Id. 
 153 U.S. and World Population Clock, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 20, 2013), 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/?intcmp=home_ pop; see also Patricia Weisselberg, Shaping 
the Energy Future in the American West: Can California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power Plants Without Violating the Dormant Commerce 
Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 185, 189 (2007) (“California has long recognized and accepted its 
role as a leader in environmental regulation.”).  
 154 See Wirth, supra note 67, at 96–97 (outlining the typical decision making process that 
results in companies acquiescing to California environmental standards).  
 155 Id.  
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California’s higher environmental standards can inadvertently replace 
weaker environmental standards in other states, simply because private 
companies wish to access the large California market.156 
However, the “California Effect” is not foolproof.  In the U.S. context, 
out-of-state entities may challenge stringent environmental laws as 
unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause.157  In the international 
context, governments may protest high environmental standards of other 
WTO-member countries as nontariff barriers to trade if they believe those 
standards result in discrimination between domestic and foreign products or 
act as unnecessary obstacles to trade.158  As a result, the nation in question 
should be ready to defend its environmental regulation under WTO 
standards.  Fortunately, REACH is consistent with WTO law.  Therefore, 
with or without TTIP negotiations, the U.S. should aspire to reform TSCA to 
meet REACH-like environmental standards.159  However, the U.S. also has 
the unique incentive to simplify and foster trade with the EU by harmonizing 
U.S. chemical regulatory standards with REACH standards.160  While 
simpler mechanisms are available which could achieve the same level of 
trade,161 the U.S. can accomplish two goals at once with upward 
harmonization.162  As advocated above, TTIP presents an unprecedented 
opportunity for two economic giants to enhance environmental protection 
through a free trade agreement, instead of placing the two fields in their 
traditional opposition to one another.  
                                                                                                                   
 156 Id.  
 157 Weisselberg, supra note 153, at 186 (describing the dormant commerce clause challenge 
to California Senate Bill 1368, which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in California 
by restricting imports of electricity from out-of-state, coal-fired electric plants).  
 158 See Kogan, supra note 66, at 501 (explaining that “the EU has recognized that the 
REACH’s length and complexity and the new legal obligations it imposes present real 
compliance challenges for industries that have affected international trade in chemical 
substance-based products . . .”).  
 159 See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 13–14 (describing shortcomings of TSCA in 
comparison to REACH and advocating United States adoption of REACH-like standards). 
 160 See generally id. at 21 (“The public, the environment, and the economies of Europe and 
the United States could potentially benefit from a trade pact that . . . encourages trade and 
investment without sacrificing the health and safety of the public.”).  
 161 See Donahue, supra note 11, at 370 (describing the “equivalence model” of 
harmonization which only requires acceptance of another nation’s standards, as opposed to 
requiring substantive changes of the law).  
 162 See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 8, at 21 (suggesting that a trade agreement like TTIP can 
potentially enhance environmental protection). 
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A.  TBT Agreement 
Before the U.S. undertakes chemical regulatory reform, the U.S. must 
ensure that any regulatory change would not violate GATT standards, which 
bind the U.S. as a WTO member.  The fact that no WTO member has 
formally challenged REACH is a good indicator that REACH is not a blatant 
violation of WTO rules.163  However, a legal challenge could arise in the 
future, as many countries have expressed concerns about the regulation since 
2006.164  The mandates of REACH, particularly the registration and data-
gathering requirements and potential total market bans, could create an 
adverse impact on the economies of other countries wishing to sell chemicals 
in the European market.165 
If a dispute arises, purely political restraints could discourage the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) from attempting to invalidate provisions of 
REACH.166  Much of the WTO’s institutional legitimacy hinges on allowing 
its members to make domestic noneconomic policy without interference 
from a politically unaccountable international organization.167  Therefore, the 
WTO could compromise its international clout if it consistently ruled against 
members’ important environmental policies in favor of trade.168  Because the 
WTO’s institutional legitimacy depends upon sovereign member states’ 
                                                                                                                   
 163 Kogan, supra note 66, at 510–14 (outlining the reasons REACH has thus far been 
deemed compliant with WTO standards: the EU notified the WTO and WTO members ahead 
of time about the regulatory changes, facilitated notice-and-comment to WTO members on 
REACH provisions, incorporated many of those comments, and engaged in bilateral 
consultations with concerned countries). 
 164 See id. at 501 (stating that “as of November 10, 2011, thirty-four WTO Members had 
expressed specific trade concerns about the EU REACH regulation.”  Further, WTO 
Secretariat report cited REACH concerns as “most frequently raised by the greatest number of 
Members.”). 
 165 See id. at 514–15 (outlining various present complaints about REACH including 
stringent registration requirements and potential discriminatory treatment).  
 166 See generally Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving 
Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625, 651–52 (2005) (noting the WTO DSB’s 
shift from examining the content of noneconomic regulations to focusing on the application of 
the regulation after the former practice “infuriated domestic policymakers and thus diminished 
their perception of GATT’s legitimacy”). 
 167 See Sidney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and 
Public Accountability, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 435, 450 (2002) (stating that the WTO is politically 
unaccountable due to the lack of public participation and transparency in dispute resolution); 
see generally Cho, supra note 166, at 673 (stating that “the mounting tension between trade 
and [noneconomic] values [can] undermine the legitimacy of the global trading system”).  
 168 See generally Cho, supra note 166, at 626 (describing mass protests by environmentalists 
at the Seattle Round that accused the WTO of placing economic concerns over environmental 
protection). 
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voluntary acquiescence to its authority,169 the WTO is likely to approach any 
challenge to domestic environmental regulation prudently, including a 
challenge to REACH. 
While political restraints indirectly shape the interaction between 
domestic environmental law and international trade law, the “Technical 
Barriers to Trade” Agreement (TBT)170 provides a more direct, textual 
analysis of the relationship.  The TBT Agreement is an international 
agreement supplementing GATT, which establishes rules and procedures 
regarding the development, adoption, and application of mandatory technical 
regulations and voluntary standards for products and the procedures (such as 
testing or certification) for determining whether a particular product meets 
such regulations or standards.171  
The TBT Agreement governs a wide array of product regulations, which 
can include labelling, safety, and recycling requirements, just to name a 
few.172  One of the TBT Agreement’s main goals is to uphold WTO 
members’ right to protect their environment, while preventing members from 
using environmental regulations to inhibit trade.173  REACH involves 
mandatory registration and information-gathering requirements directly 
affecting chemicals and products containing chemical substances in the 
interest of health and environmental protection.174  Therefore, if a challenge 
to REACH arises, it will most naturally fit under the TBT Agreement.175  
Because the TBT agreement attempts to balance the goals of trade 
liberalization and promotion of members’ sovereign rights to regulate, the 
WTO would find the regulation TBT-consistent if REACH has a legitimate 
purpose and does not discriminatorily burden or unnecessarily restrict 
international trade.176  Complaining members would then have to submit to 
the regulation for access to the EU chemical market.177 
                                                                                                                   
 169 See Joshua Meltzer, State Sovereignty and the Legitimacy of the WTO, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 693, 693 (2005) (explaining that state consent to joining the WTO and following 
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 170 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
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 173 Kogan, supra note 66, at 496.  
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A comprehensive TBT analysis is beyond the scope of this Note and has 
been covered by other commentators.178  However, this discussion of 
REACH’s consistency with the TBT outlines additional non-environmental 
incentives for the U.S. to harmonize its standards with EU standards.  First, if 
REACH can withstand legal scrutiny at the WTO, then the U.S. will 
ultimately have to submit to the EU law anyway.179  Furthermore, 
harmonizing TSCA with REACH could streamline trade since the chemical 
industry would only have to follow one standard.180  In this context, 
harmonization would provide both environmental and economic benefits to 
the U.S.  For these reasons, REACH’s compliance with the TBT may be of 
special interest to the U.S., especially in light of recent TTIP negotiations. 
A TBT analysis of REACH would ultimately focus on two major issues.  
The first issue is whether REACH engenders protectionism, meaning it 
discriminates against foreign chemicals in order to unfairly benefit the EU’s 
chemical industry.181  The second separate but related issue is whether 
REACH is an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.182 
As a threshold matter, the WTO DSB would determine whether REACH 
is subject to the TBT Agreement.183  REACH would fall under the TBT 
Agreement if the law is a technical regulation.184  Technical regulations are 
documents mandating that an identifiable product (or group of products) 
conforms to rules regarding the product’s intrinsic characteristics or product-
related characteristics.185  Examples of these types of rules include 
requirements that products bearing certain labels be produced in an 
environmentally responsible manner or not contain certain additives or 
ingredients.186 
                                                                                                                   
 178 Id. at 556–662. 
 179 See id. at 668 (reiterating that the WTO DSB will not rule against necessary, 
nondiscriminatory regulations even if those measures restrict trade).   
 180 See Donahue, supra note 11, at 373 (demonstrating the economic benefit of 
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 181 See Kogan, supra note 66, at 532 (describing the TBT discrimination analysis under 
Article 2.1).  
 182 Id. at 605 (describing the TBT trade-restrictiveness analysis under Article 2.2).  
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 185 TBT Agreement, supra note 170, at Annex 1.1. 
 186 See generally Kogan, supra note 66, at 524–66 (analyzing the contested TBT measures in 
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The second question, and first major issue, would be whether REACH is 
“trade discriminatory.”187  Trade discrimination would occur if the EU used 
REACH to treat chemicals produced outside the EU differently than similar 
chemicals produced in an EU country.188  This kind of discrimination is 
conceivable.  For example, if a chemical produced predominately in the EU 
passed the regulatory phases of REACH, while a “like” chemical (a non-EU 
chemical containing similar physical properties, with similar end-uses and 
tariff classifications, which is generally perceived and used similarly by 
consumers) was deemed too dangerous for sale on the European market, a 
country could bring and win a TBT claim.189 
The third question, and second major issue, is whether REACH is an 
“unnecessary obstacle to trade that is more trade-restrictive than necessary to 
fulfill a legitimate objective.”190  This question is a related, but subsequent 
inquiry to the discrimination analysis.  This analysis focuses more upon the 
competitive relationship between like products and the purpose of the 
regulation itself, as opposed to focusing primarily on the products’ 
similarities.191  Here, the DSB would examine whether REACH’s purpose is 
truly environmental protection or whether the EU had ulterior motives in 
enacting the law.192  The DSB would look at REACH’s stated purposes, 
whether REACH fulfills those purposes, and whether REACH unfairly alters 
competition in the chemical marketplace.193  If less trade-restrictive 
alternatives are available to the EU which would accomplish the same level 
of environmental protection, then REACH would violate the TBT 
Agreement.194  
The TBT Agreement also requires that WTO members harmonize their 
technical regulations with international standards by basing their domestic 
rules on those international standards.195  However, if a WTO member 
                                                                                                                   
 187 Id. at 530.  
 188 See id. at 532 (describing the “national treatment” obligation in Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement, which prohibits  protectionist measures favoring domestic products over foreign-
produced products).  
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registered chemicals and products containing chemicals). 
 190 Id. at 547.  
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 193 See id. at 549–55 (describing the “legitimate objective” analysis). 
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 195 TBT Agreement, supra note 170, art. 2.4.  
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desires to promulgate a technical regulation not based upon an international 
standard, this standard may withstand scrutiny if the member transparently 
enacts the technical regulation by notifying other WTO members.196  In this 
instance the EU provided notification even before REACH’s enactment and 
accepted and implemented changes from public comments.197  Whether 
REACH strictly adheres to an international standard or not, these actions 
support REACH’s legality under the TBT Agreement.198  
As noted above, political pressure could compel WTO DSB deference to 
the EU’s environmental policy preferences.199   More importantly, recent WTO 
jurisprudence suggests that the DSB would likely defer to the EU’s policy 
choices if a reasonable basis to restrict the chemicals from the market exists, 
such as public health or environmental protection.200  For example, some 
commentators have noted a “shift” in WTO jurisprudence regarding countries’ 
risk assessment analysis.201  Often, a product’s “risk”—which can affect 
whether the product is “like” another product—is determined based on 
quantitative risk assessment procedures.202  However, the WTO DSB is 
increasingly recognizing qualitative risk assessment as sufficient to justify 
trade-restrictive measures.203  This apparent shift indicates that the EU could 
potentially succeed in a dispute by arguing that REACH-registered chemicals 
and non-REACH-registered chemicals are not “like” if consumers prefer 
REACH-registered chemicals/products over non-REACH-registered 
chemicals/products.204  While a definitive conclusion of REACH’s TBT 
legality would be premature at this time, recent trends and political factors 
indicate that REACH is likely to withstand scrutiny under WTO law. 
                                                                                                                   
 196 Id. art. 2.9; Kogan, supra note 66, at 498. 
 197 Kogan, supra note 66, at 500–01.  
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B.  Harmonization 
Assuming that REACH is legal under the TBT Agreement, the next 
question is whether to harmonize U.S. chemical regulations with REACH at 
all, and if so, how to harmonize.  As noted before, harmonization would be 
in the United States’ best interest from an environmental perspective because 
TSCA regulates chemicals poorly.205  In addition to the environmental angle, 
the United States could also further TTIP’s free trade goals by aligning its 
standards with REACH standards.206  Despite the potential environmental 
and trade benefits, harmonization is politically difficult.207  Implementing 
new and different standards is also challenging on a practical level.208 
Multiple types of harmonization and methods of implementation exist.209  
The two basic types of harmonization are “full” harmonization and 
“equivalence” harmonization.210  Full harmonization occurs when countries 
adjust their regulations until they are the same.211  Equivalence 
harmonization occurs when countries make no substantive changes in the 
law, only agreeing that one standard is substitutable for the other standard.212  
This Note calls for full harmonization, but full harmonization may go three 
ways: up, down, or a compromise in the middle.213  
Full upward harmonization occurs when a country with lower 
environmental standards raises them to match another country’s higher 
environmental standards.214  For example, if the U.S. changes TSCA to 
match REACH, full upward harmonization will occur.  Full downward 
harmonization occurs when a country with high environmental standards 
lowers them to match a country with lower standards.215  If the EU changed 
                                                                                                                   
 205 See supra text accompanying note 93. 
 206 See Bernabe-Riefkohl, supra note 7, at 212 (“[G]iven the disparity of regulations, 
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REACH to match TSCA, full downward harmonization would occur.  
Intermediate harmonization occurs when each country compromises to create 
a completely new standard.216  If the United States and the EU negotiate a 
totally new standard to eliminate regulatory differences, they will be 
engaging in intermediate harmonization.  A fourth, but less environmentally 
desirable option is equivalent harmonization.217  The EU could simply agree 
to accept TSCA standards as equal to REACH standards by signing an 
equivalency agreement.218 
While this Note suggests full upward harmonization, history suggests the 
U.S. and EU are likely to opt for the fourth option—equivalent 
harmonization.219  In 1997, the U.S. and the EU signed the Mutual 
Recognition Agreement (MRA), which is an equivalence agreement 
governing six product sectors.220  Significantly, the U.S.-EC MRA 
establishes that the U.S. and EU will accept one another’s procedural 
standards as equivalent, while their substantive domestic standards will 
remain unchanged.221 
The nature of the agreement could implicate REACH in the following 
ways.  First, the chemical sector is not covered under the U.S.-EC MRA, so 
REACH-TSCA harmonization is not automatically subject to the MRA’s 
equivalency standard.222  Second, however, the U.S. and EU could amend the 
MRA to include the chemical sector.223  Nevertheless, even if the nations add 
chemicals as a sector to the MRA harmonization agreement, REACH would 
not be implicated unless it is purely a procedural regulation.224  Negotiators 
could reasonably construe REACH as a procedural regulation since the core 
of the regulation focuses on registration and information-gathering.225  
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However, if REACH’s registration and testing requirements affect consumer 
tastes and habits, thereby altering the competitive nature of the chemical 
products, then REACH could more readily be seen as regulating the sale of 
safe vs non-safe chemicals and chemical products.226  Therefore, negotiators 
could also portray REACH as a substantive regulation not covered by the 
MRA.227 
Whether or not the U.S.-EC MRA could ultimately solve the 
harmonization problem between TSCA and REACH, past negotiating 
practices suggest that the two nations use the equivalency method to achieve 
regulatory harmonization.228  Even if the U.S. and EU were to decide against 
specifically using the MRA to bridge the chemical regulatory gap, they could 
negotiate a similarly structured agreement specifically for TTIP.  
Alternatively, they could include within TTIP a side agreement declaring that 
the EU accepts U.S. standards as equivalent with REACH standards.  
Similarly, TTIP negotiators could agree to establish a dispute resolution 
system specifically for TTIP, in which environmental disputes would be 
solved without fusing environmental standards.  While these methods of 
equivalent harmonization could successfully liberalize the chemical trade by 
functionally eliminating regulatory trade barriers, full upward harmonization 
would achieve the same economic goals, while also enhancing U.S. 
environmental and health protection.229 
Though equivalent harmonization is admittedly the easier, more 
politically viable option,230 full upward harmonization is preferable and 
possible.  The EU already confirmed that it will not compromise its 
environmental/health standards for TTIP.231  Relying on equivalence 
harmonization of REACH and TSCA would compromise the environmental 
goals of REACH.232  If TSCA’s standards were declared an adequate 
substitute, EU importers would no longer be required to register U.S. 
chemicals, meaning these chemicals would not be subject to REACH’s 
                                                                                                                   
 226 See Kogan, supra note 66, at 547–48.  
 227 But see Donahue, supra note 11, at 380–81 (suggesting that the MRA could be amended 
to cover both procedural and substantive regulations, which would subject both types of 
regulations to equivalent harmonization).  
 228 Id. at 373. 
 229 See id. at 367–68 (stating that the purpose of harmonization is “economic integration and 
the reduction of trade barriers” and that “harmonization . . . increases market accessibility, 
reduces costs . . . and boosts overall growth” and can “lead to improved environmental 
protection”).  
 230 Id. at 382–83.  
 231 See supra text accompanying note 52.  
 232 See Donahue, supra note 11, at 371 (arguing that equivalence harmonization does not 
protect the environment). 
756 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 43:727 
 
further evaluation and testing requirements.233  Since the vast majority of 
U.S. chemicals escape the EPA’s scrutiny and the U.S. is a major chemical 
exporter, equivalent harmonization would not satisfy REACH’s health and 
environmental protection requirements.234  Further, the EU is accustomed to 
aiming for and achieving upward harmonization within its own borders.235  
Therefore, the EU is probably optimistic about full upward harmonization.  
In the WTO context, the TBT Agreement requires harmonization with 
international standards, and also contemplates harmonization between 
countries in TBT Article 2.7.236  While Article 2.7 suggests countries engage 
in equivalence harmonization, the language does not affirmatively restrict 
full upward harmonization.237  Furthermore, as discussed above, WTO 
membership does not directly curb the United States’ right to adopt and 
change its own domestic policies.238  Finally, while full upward 
harmonization is generally the most challenging harmonization technique, it 
is more feasible between similarly developed governments like the U.S. and 
EU239  Though the EU is often perceived as having comparatively higher 
environmental standards,240 the United States also aspires to employ high 
environmental standards, so harmonization in this area is politically and 
technically possible. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
The United States and the European Union have a unique opportunity to 
meet two equally important goals through TTIP.  First and foremost, TTIP is 
a bilateral trade agreement that can enhance and ease economic interactions 
between two huge economies, thereby improving standards of living for 
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United States and European Union citizens.241  Second, TTIP could also 
serve as a tool to effectuate other legitimate goals, including better 
environmental protection.242  Further, using TTIP as a tool to achieve more 
comprehensive chemical regulation in the world’s two largest economies 
could prompt a “California Effect” in which other nations would voluntarily 
adjust their chemical regulatory standards to meet those of the European 
Union and the United States to gain access to their markets.  This type of 
economic and environmental cooperation could shift the way the 
international community views the interaction between trade and the 
environment and, hopefully, open the door to further international 
environmental cooperation in the future.243  While TTIP’s economic goals 
can be accomplished through simpler means such as equivalence 
harmonization, the better option is for the United States to fully harmonize 
upward, creating freer trade flows between the two nations while also better 
protecting the U.S. environment.244 
Full upward harmonization between REACH and TSCA is an ambitious, 
but needed undertaking.   As stated by the USTR, “[t]he challenges posed by 
efforts to improve regulatory cooperation between the European Union and 
the United States should not be underestimated. But there are reasons to be 
optimistic.”245 
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